In the secure aggregation of distributed information problem, a deck of cards is dealt among several players, who must then share the information about how the cards are distributed amongst them by means of public announcements intercepted by an eavesdropper. After the information is exchanged, all of the communicating players must know the entire deal, but the eavesdropper must remain ignorant about who holds each card.
Introduction
Suppose that m players are dealt cards from some deck D. Each of the players may see her hand, but not the others'. They then want to inform each other of their hand, but there is a catch: an eavesdropper, Eaves, may hear all communications, and the players do not want him to learn who holds any card. Moreover, they may not encrypt the information in any way, so that Eaves receives the same information as the rest of the players. Is there a way to share their information safely in this setting?
The scenario described above is a multi-agent variation of the well-known "Russian cards problem", which is more than one-and-a-half centuries old [7] but has recently had renewed attention [11] , leading to many new solutions (e.g. [1, 3, 10] ). Interest in this problem arises from the fact that it is based on information-theoretic cryptography [9] , where security is not contingent on the computational complexity of breaking the code but rather on communications that do not contain sufficient information for an eavesdropper to learn the original message. In [6] , the original problem was generalized by allowing an arbitrary number of players, but also simplified by assuming that the eavesdropper has no cards in his hand. Such a multi-player setup had previously been considered in [5] , albeit with a very different approach.
One key difference between the setting we consider and the original Russian cards problem is that, in the original, two announcements are usually sufficient for the information exchange, whereas in our setting one might expect to have at least one announcement per player. However, we remark that longer protocols are already needed to solve some instances of the original Russian cards problem [2, 12] .
A second key difference is that there are several ways of generalizing the original safety conditions. In the original problem, three players, Alice, Bob and Cath, hold cards, and Alice and Bob want to communicate their hand safely. This means that, for any card x not held by Cath, Cath should not know who holds it, which is equivalent to stating that she considers it possible that either Alice or Bob holds it.
But suppose instead that Alice, Bob and Cath are communicating while being spied on by Eaves. It is no longer equivalent to state that Eaves does not know who holds a given card x than to state that Eaves considers it possible that any of the communicating players holds x. The latter is much stronger; in fact, for Eaves to remain ignorant about who holds a given card, it is sufficient for him to doubt whether Alice or Bob holds it, even if he is certain that it is not on Cath's card. Both are reasonable generalizations; we call the first weak safety and the second full safety. In [6] we formalized the secure aggregation of distributed information problem and constructed weakly safe solutions for any number of agents. Our goal now is to construct, instead, fully safe solutions. These are based on finite linear algebra, and typically one player holds a large portion of the cards. However, for infinitely many values of a, the size of the deck may be chosen so that each of the m players holds more than a and less than 4m 2 a of the cards.
A motivating example
Let us begin by presenting a solution for a distribution of type (12, 2, 2) . In this setting, Alice draws twelve cards from a deck of sixteen, while Bob and Cath each draw two cards. The claim is that Alice, Bob and Cath can communicate their cards to each other by way of public announcements, in such a way that, after the exchange, each of Alice, Bob and Cath knows the entire deal, whether Eaves the eavesdropper considers it possible that any player holds any card.
Here we use the fact that there is a field F 4 , whose elements are {0, 1, α, α 2 } satisfying α 2 = α + 1. With this we construct a 16-point plane, F . Alice makes her announcement as follows. First, she randomly assigns each card in the deck to a point on the plane, with the only condition that the cards she does not hold form a line ℓ. In the figure, Bob holds spades, Cath holds clubs and Alice holds diamonds, so that ℓ is the diagonal x = y. Then we observe the following: since Bob holds two cards, and two points define a line, Bob knows exactly which line his and Cath's cards lie on and thus he knows Alice's hand. Similarly, Cath knows Alice's hand, and in this example in fact Bob and Cath know the entire deal. However, they must inform Alice of their hand. So it remains to inform Alice of their hands. A simple idea that Bob and Cath could use is simply to announce the first coordinates of the points on their hand. In the figure, Bob would say "The first coordinates of my hand are {1, α 2 }", while Cath would say "The first coordinates of my hand are {0, α}." In fact, Cath's announcement follows from Bob's, so it is enough for Bob to make his announcement, although we remark that this will not be the case with more players.
As mentioned, Bob and Cath already knew the entire deal, but now Alice can use the fact that each point of ℓ is uniquely determined by its first coordinate to infer Bob's and Cath's actual hand. Meanwhile, given any card x, Eaves cannot tell whether or not Alice holds x, since he cannot distinguish the current deal between any other deal where Bob and Cath hold a line parallel to ℓ.
However, this exchange is not fully card safe. For indeed, since he knows that Bob's hand projects onto {1, α 2 }, Eaves knows that Bob does not hold, say, (0, 0). Thus this strategy is only weakly safe. But there is a variation which does yield full card safety.
Observe that Eaves need only consider lines parallel to ℓ to remain ignorant about Alice's hand. However, the only thing that he knows about ℓ is that it is not parallel to the vector (0, 1) (otherwise, Bob's and Cath's cards all would have the same first coordinate). Thus Eaves considers it possible that Bob's and Cath's cards lie on a line with slope (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, α) or (1, α 2 ) but not (0, 1). Note also that F 4 has four elements. Thus, there is a bijection σ between the slopes Eaves considers possible and the elements of F 4 . It does not matter how we choose σ, so for example we may take σ(1, x) = x. This σ will be used to shift the elements of F 4 around and add more uncertainty to Bob's announcement. To be precise, if ℓ has directing vector v, Bob will now announce, instead of the first coordinates of his hand, these coordinates plus σ(v). In this example, since Bob's hands project onto {1, α 2 } and ℓ has directing vector (1, 1), Bob will instead announce the value of
His announcement will then take the form "If my cards lie on a line with directing vector v, then the sum of the set of first coordinates of my cards with σ(v) is {0, α}."
This new strategy is actually fully card safe. To see this, first note as before that Alice can hold any card (just replace ℓ by a parallel line as needed). But any card may also be held by Bob or by Cath. Let us show this with the card (0, 0), held by Cath. Because in the actual deal Cath holds this card, Eaves evidently finds is possible that Cath holds (0, 0). But let us see that Eaves also considers it possible that Bob holds it.
There are four lines ℓ ′ passing through (0, 0) that do not have directing vector (0, 1), and Eaves considers all of these as the possible set of cards that Bob and Cath hold. If ℓ ′ has directing vector (1, 1), as is actually the case, then Cath would hold (0, 0). If instead it had directing vector (1, α 2 ), then we see that (1, 1) has first coordinate 1, and σ(1, α 2 ) = α 2 , whereas 1 + α 2 = α, one of the points in Bob's announcement. So, if indeed Bob's and Cath's hands would form the line y = α 2 x, then according to Bob's announcement, Bob would hold (0, 0). A similar exercise may be applied to any point x on the plane to see that either Bob or Cath may hold x, where we use the fact that σ is a bijection, so we can tailor σ(v) to assign any card to either player.
In a more general setting, there may be m communicating players. We will work in F d+1 q , where q ≥ m is a prime power and d > 0. Alice will hold all cards except for those that would make up a hyperplane, that is, she would hold q d+1 − q d cards, which is more than any other player. The rest of the players share the remaining q d cards, with the only restriction that each of them holds more than q d−1 of them. Then, Alice will announce that the complement of her cards form a hyperplane A, and each other player P holds enough cards to be able to identify A, and thus Alice's hand. Alice need only arrange it so that the vector e d+1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1) is not parallel to A. She will also choose a function σ which assigns to each hyperspace not parallel to e d+1 , a point on F d q . In our example, the line ℓ plays the role of the hyperplane A (since a line on the plane is a hyperplane). It turns out that the number of hyperspaces not parallel to e d+1 is precisely q d , the same as the number of points on F d q , so σ is a bijection, just like in our example (where d = 1).
If we denote by π :
q the projection onto the first d components, each player P will announce π[X P ] + σ(A), where X P is the set of points P holds (technically, the image of P 's hand under Alice's chosen assignment). As we shall see, even in this more general setting, this strategy will always be informative and fully card safe. In the remainder of this paper, we will make this precise.
The secure aggregation of distributed information problem
Here we will give the basic definitions needed to set up the multiagent Russian cards problem, including the notions of informativity and safety that concern us. There is an initial secure dealing phase in which a card deal is selected randomly. The process by which the cards are distributed is treated as a black box. Afterwards, the players have knowledge of their own cards and of the distribution types of the deal, but know nothing more about others' cards. Thus, they are not able to distinguish between different deals where they hold the same hand. We model this by equivalence relations between deals; since from the perspective of player P , a deal H is indistinguishable from deal H ′ whenever H P = H ′ P , we define H ∼ P H ′ if and only if H P = H ′ P . If the players are numbered P 1 , . . . , P m , we may write ∼ i instead of ∼ Pi .
Basic terminology and notation
For simplicity we will assume that players take turns, so that if the players are listed by P 1 , . . . , P m , then P 1 realizes an action first, followed by P 2 , etc. We will model actions as 'tokens' from a set A, which the players use to convey information. In a practical setting, actions would be strings of symbols (e.g. English sentences), but could simply be modelled as natural numbers.
Definition 3.2 (Runs)
. Let A be a set whose elements will be called actions. A (finite) run is a (possibly empty) sequence ρ = α 1 , . . . , α n of actions from A. The empty run is denoted by (). If ρ = α 1 , . . . , α n and α is an action we write ρ * α for α 1 , . . . , α n , α. An infinite run is an infinite sequence α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , . . . of actions. Runs will be assumed finite unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. We denote the length of a run ρ by |ρ|. We denote the set of finite runs by Run.
We now define the notion of protocol we will use. Below and throughout the text, we use (x) d to mean the unique r ∈ [1, d] such that x ≡ r (mod d). This notation will be a useful shorthand to indicate the player whose turn it is after x steps.
Definition 3.3 (Protocol). Let Deal = Deal(s).
A protocol (fors) is a function π assigning to every deal H ∈ Deal and every run ρ ∈ Run a set of actions π(H, ρ) ⊆ A such that if α ∈ π(H, ρ), i = (|ρ|+1) m (so that it is the turn of the player P i ) and protocol π is a pair (H, ρ) of a deal H ∈ Deal and a run ρ = α 1 , . . . , α n , such that α i+1 ∈ π(H, ρ [1,i] ) for every i < n, where ρ [1,i] 
protocol is terminating if it has no infinite executions.
Thus, a protocol is a tree-like set of runs representing a non-deterministic strategy for the communicating players. Once a deal has been fixed, a protocol assigns to each run a set of actions out of which the player whose turn it is must choose one at random. These actions are determined exclusively by the information the player who is to move has access to, which is assumed to be only: (i) her hand, (ii) the distribution types of the deck D, (iii) the announcements that have been made previously and (iv) the protocol being executed. Note that protocols are generally non-deterministic and hence may have many executions.
Informative and safe protocols. SADI problems
Now we will define some properties that protocols may have which are desirable in our setting. The first property is informativity: that players in the team learn some or all of each other's cards (or, the entire deal) at the end of its execution: A terminating protocol π is wi: weakly informative if every terminating execution of π is informative for some player in P.
i: informative if every terminating execution of π is informative for every player in P.
Clearly, i implies wi, and in general they are not equivalent. The second important property is safety: for any card c, the eavesdropper Eaves should not know who holds c.
Definition 3.5 (Safety of protocols).
Given a natural number n, an execution (H, ρ) of a protocol π is n-safe for the card c if there is a set G ⊆ P with |G| = n such that, for all P ∈ G, there is a deal H ′ such that c ∈ H ′ P and (H ′ , ρ) is also an execution of π.
The protocol π is n-safe if it is n-safe for every card c and every execution (H, ρ).
A protocol is fully safe if it is m-safe, where m is the number of players.
Observe that the notion of weak safety from [6] is equivalent to our notion of 2-safety. Definition 3.6. A secure aggregation of distributed information problem is a triple (s, ι, n) consisting of a distribution types, an informativity condition ι ∈ {wi,i} and a natural number n.
A protocol π is a solution for (s, ι, n) if it satisfies the informativity condition ι and is n-safe.
In [6] we focused on ι = i and n = 2, although the latter condition was called weak safety there. In this paper we will instead consider informative and fully safe protocols, i.e. ι = i and n is the number of players.
Geometric preliminaries
Our solution is based on finite linear algebra. We assume some basic familiarity with finite fields and finite geometry; these are covered in texts such as [8] and [4] , respectively.
Throughout the paper, q will denote a prime or a power of a prime, and F q the field with q elements. If d is any natural number, F and equality holds unless U, V are parallel, in which case their intersection is empty. The following will also be useful. q−1 . For the second claim, once again assume that x = 0 and fix y. Choose any hyperplane W through the origin not meeting y. Then, given a hyperplane U meeting both x and y, U ∩ W is a (d − 2)-dimensional subspace of W , i.e. a hyperplane of W . It is easy to check that U is in turn determined by U ∩ W , so that in fact the number of hyperplanes touching x and y is equal to the number of hyperspaces of W , which by the previous claim is
We will only need a simple consequence of the above lemma. Proof. We merely need to subtract the number of hyperplanes meeting both x and y from the total number meeting x, which by Lemma 4.1 gives us
In our example in Section 2, it was important that the line ℓ not be 'vertical'. In the higher-dimensional setting, we will replace 'non-vertical' by 'transversal'.
Recall that e d+1 is the vector which has zeroes in all components except the (d + 1)-component, which is equal to one. Recalling Section 2, it is not enough for players to project their hand onto their first components; they must also 'shift' them, using a function σ which depends on the 'slope' of A, which may also be expressed by saying that σ is constant among parallel hyperplanes.
We remark that a shift system can be naturally constructed in R d+1 as follows. Identify R d with the hyperplane x d+1 = 0 and consider a transversal hyperplane A. Since we want σ to be constant on all hyperplanes parallel to A, we may assume that A passes through e d+1 . Then, trace the line h orthogonal to A passing through e d+1 . This line h intersects R d at precisely one point. We can take this point to be σ(A) (see Figure 2) .
In the case of finite vector spaces we will not attempt to define σ in a natural way, but we can still show that it can be constructed in this setting. Proof. Using Lemma 4.2, we see that, for
A is the identity on A is proven similarly.
The protocol
With the above ingredients, we are ready to define our protocol. We remark that, in order to define a protocol, it is sufficient to define its maximal executions, which we will use in order to simplify the following definition. Then, given a deal H, the maximal runs of the protocol are of the form (H, α * ρ), where
• ρ is a sequence of announcements α P for each P = A where
Our goal is to prove the following:
Theorem 5.1. The multigeometric protocol is an informative, strongly cardsafe protocol.
We divide the proof into several lemmas. Proof. Let (H, ρ * β) be an execution of the multigeometric protocol, P be the last player to make an announcement and H ′ be a deal such that H P = H ′ P . We must check that (H ′ , ρ * β) is also an execution of our protocol. First assume that ρ has one element, so that it is of the form α = (f, σ).
] is a transversal hyperplane and σ is a shift assignment, and thus (H ′ , ρ) is also an execution of the protocol. Otherwise, P = A, and the last announcement is of the form β = π
is also an execution of our protocol.
Lemma 5.2. The multigeometric protocol is informative.
Proof. Let (H, ρ) be a terminal execution of the protocol, and let P = Q be players. We must check that, if (H ′ , ρ) is another terminal execution of the protocol with H In either case, by the definition of the protocol Q has made an announcement of the form X Q with Proof. Let x be any card, P be any player and (H, ρ) a terminal execution of the multigeometric protocol. We must show that there is a deal H ′ with x ∈ H ′ P such that (H ′ , ρ) is also an execution of the geometric protocol. Let (f, σ) be Alice's first announcement.
. By Lemma 4.4 we have that for all Q,
is also an execution of the protocol where Alice holds x. Otherwise, P = A and we proceed as follows. Since H P = ∅, we must also have X P = ∅ and we may pick v ∈ X P . Let w = π(f (x)), and let U be a hyperspace such that σ(U ) = v − w (which exists because σ is onto). Then, there is a (unique) hyperplane A ′ parallel to U such that f (x) ∈ A ′ , and by definition of a shift assignment, σ(A ′ ) = σ(U ). As before, let H
. Then, A ′ is transversal, and by Lemma 4.4 we have that for all Q,
is also an execution of the protocol. However, note that
is an execution of ρ such that x ∈ H ′ P . Since P was arbitrary we conclude that the protocol is fully card-safe.
With this, we may prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By Lemma 5.1, the multigeometric protocol is a protocol according to Definition 3.3; moreover, by Lemma 5.2, it is informative, whereas by Lemma 5.3, it is safe, as needed.
Finding balanced distribution types
The multigeometric protocol has the disadvantage that one player must hold a disproportionate portion of the cards. However, this can be controlled to a certain extent. In this section we will show how, given the number m of players, one may find distribution types over m players that are not too unbalanced.
For this we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. Given a natural number m > 0 there is a prime power q such that m ≤ q < 2m.
Proof. Just take q to be the unique power of 2 satisfying the required bounds.
There are many possible improvements to this result (for example we may take q to be prime), but this simple version will suffice for our purposes. With this, we may prove the following. Hence by Theorem 5.1, the multigeometric protocol is informative and fully safe fors. Moreover, setting a = q d−1 we see that for all i > 1, s i ≥ a, whereas s 1 < q d = q 2 a < 2m 2 a. Since s 1 is the player with the most cards, the claim follows.
As an application, let us return to the example of Section 2. Here, there were three players, so we chose q = 4 and d = 1. The disadvantage was that the distribution type was noticeably unbalanced, since Alice held the vast majority of the cards. However, as the construction in the proof of Corollary 6.1 shows, we can actually take q = 3 provided d > 1. So, let us try some specific values. For d = 2 and q = 3, we obtain the distribution type (18, 4, 5). As we take larger values of d (and fix q = 3), we obtain the distribution sizes (54, 10, 17) for d = 3, (162, 28, 53), for d = 4, (486, 82, 161) for d = 5. In fact, it does not matter how we distribute the other players' cards provided each holds more than q d−1 , so we may distribute them more evenly and obtain (486, 121, 122). Note that, while Alice always holds most of the cards, she only holds about four times as many as the other players, and this remains true for arbitrarily large d.
Concluding remarks
We have shown that the multiagent Russian cards problem has fully safe solutions in a large number of instances. A drawback to our solution is that one of the agents must hold more cards than the rest of the players combined. Thus a natural line of future inquiry is whether fully safe solutions exist for a wider class of distribution types.
A second line of inquiry involves probabilistic information. In the origninal Russian cards problem, many known solutions may give the eavesdropper probabilistic information about who holds each card, but [10] explored perdectly safe solutions, where the probability that a card was held by a certain player did not change after the execution of the protocol. Possible generalizations of perfect safety remain to be studied in the multi-agent case, and may well be an intriguing line of future inquiry.
